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Draft Recommendatian
on a European spam-based obsematian systent
The Assembly,
(i) Taking account of the fundamental importance of space in a global strategic concept of security in
Europe;
(ii) Sfessing that space-based observation means are an essential and indispensable part of the Euro-
pean security and defence policy;
(iii) Believing therefore that Europe must equip itself as soon as possible with a space-based observa-
tion system that is both autonomous and interdependent;
(iv) Believing that Europe has the necessary technological and industrial capability to establish such a
system;
(v) Considering that the military use of space-based means is a global operation, the various parts of
which cannot remain separated;
(vi) Renewing its congratulations to the industrial consortium for its feasibiliry studies of the main sys-
tem and the stuiiy management team for assessing these studies,'
(vii) Congratulating also the space research institutes of the various member countries of WEU on their
outstanding contribution to these studies;
(viii) Taktng account, nevertheless, of the difficulties that will inevitably be encountered in creating this
system, connected mainly with the cost, implementation and use;
(bc) Taking into consideration the various options available in deciding to create this system, which may
be summarised as follows:
(a) an independent WEU system;
(b) a system based on work already carried out (Helios I);
(c) the continuation, pure and simple, of the present work of the Satellite Centre in image acquisi-
tion and interpretation ;
(x) Considering that the frst of these solutions is technologically achievable but very costly, 11r{ that
it e tt irA in no wf meets Europe's need to have independent space-based information means, which are
essential for its seiurity and defence and, in consequence, for the exercise of its sovereignty;
(xi) Considering that the second solution seems to be the most pragmatic and easiest to implement, since
it witt draw on efforts already made and experience gained from co-operation which has proved viable and
fruitful (Helios I) and is, additionally, the least costly;
(xii) Welcoming the prospects for a significant participation in the Helios tr programme by Germany,
Italy and Spain, alongside France;
(xiii) Conscious nevertheless of the many diffrculties linked to participation in the financing and indus-
ilal'production of the system and its use which must be resolved in order to develop, produce and exploit
the system;
(xiv) Recognising, moreover, that discussions should be started with the United States and possibly other
countries on the possibility of co-operation in early warning and antimissile defence systems;
(m) Taking account, finally, of the overriding need for the Torrej6n Satellite Centre to be given perma-
nent status,
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RScoMMENDs rHAT rm CouNcu-
1. 
. 
Immediately take the measures necessary to make the Tonej6n Satellite Centre permanent and
make provision for the budgetary means necessary for making use of the most satisfictory satellite
lmages;
2. 
.-. 
Seek agreement with the countries deciding to participate in the Helios and Osiris programmes forfacilitating implementali":_g.f these. programmes and assotiating other member countriesl integrating
them progressively.into WEU's activities and, to this end, requesting participant countries to open o[ tfresS
prograrnmes to their WEU partners;
?. Task the Space Group with studying the integration of these programmes into WEU's activities andinvite the.intelligence section of the Planning Cell, as soon as it is iet up, to give its opinion on problems
connected with the use of the system;
4. Conduct the necessary_studies on a European early warning and antimissile defence system and
foster c-o_-_operation with the United States and, as necessary, with other partners pursuing aimjsimilar to
those of WEU in these areas.
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Explnnatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mn lznzer and Mn Vallzir, Co'rapporteurs)
I.Introdactian
l. Assembly Documents l3O4 (1992), 1393
(1993),1436 (1994) and 1437 (1994) studied in
depth an aspect that is clearly fundamental to the
fu[ure common European security policy and
hence to a European defence policy: the creation
of a European space-based observation system.
2. These documents surveyed the activities of
the WEU Council in space matters, analysed the
consequences of the evolution of the international
situation on setting up a European space-based
observation system, its strategic importance, the
different tasks such a system would have to
accomplish, the challenges which had to be met
and Europe's technological and industrial capabi-
lity for uhdertaking a project of this dimension;
thi:y also analysed current and future mifitary-
space programmes and studied the activities of
national space research institutes, the possibility
of co-operation between the latter (Document
1434) afi the different possibilities for space co-
operation in Europe and the expediency of partici-
pation from outside Europe in this area.
3. Finally, the Technological and Aerospace
Committee organised colloquies on these same
subjects over recent years which brought together
the players essential for implementing such pro-jecti, in order to enable them to present their res-
pective positions and different interests, needs
and difficulties, and to discuss them.
4. A single conviction has been the inspiration
for all these initiatives: namely that such a project
required a rigorous and in-depth study of the stra-
teg1c, technical, industrial and financial problems
that it raised and that once these problems had
been examined and resolved a firm and tenacious
political will was necessary in order finally to
achieve the system.
5. The colloquy organised recently by our
committee (on24th and 25th March 1995) in San
Agustin, Gran Canaria, under the same title as the
present report, represented a synthesis of work
carried out to date in order to be able to present a
range of information, considerations and conclu-
sions to the WEU Council that might help the
WEU defence ministers to take the best decision
on the creation ofa European space-based observ-
ation system 
- 
a decision which is to be taken in
the coming months.
6. The present report also seeks to make a
realistic and pragmatic summary of the speeches
and debates at San Agustin, avoiding, insofar as
possible, any further mention of data given in
previous reports. Moreover, your Rapporteurs
will draw the conclusions and formulate
recommendations in the best interests of Europe
so that the future European security and defence
policy will have the instrument essential to achieve
its objectives: a European space-based observ-
ation system.
II. The stralegir d.imensian
7. If the fall of the Soviet empire put an end to
certain risks and threats hovering over Europe's
existence, it nevertheless gave rise to a whole
range of factors of instability that might have
considerable repercussions on our securiry: wide-
spread political and economic crises, ethnic and
bbrder conflicts due to nationalist extremism,
massive immigration with unpredictable reper-
cussions, extreme deterioration of the environ-
ment, the emergence of powerful mafias frequent-
ly linked to trafficking in drugs and/or armaments
and nuclear materials creating a real risk of arma-
ments proliferation, particularly of ballistic mis-
sile syitems etc. Besides and at times precisely
because of these problems we are faced with
numerous regional conflicts and risk factors with
direct and far-reaching repercussions on Europe's
security, such as for example the conflict raging
in former Yugoslavia, the aftermath of the war
between Iraq and Kuwait, the Middle East situ-
ation still far from a final and satisfactory solu-
tion, the Kurdish problem and the civil war that is
rife in many regions of Africa (Rwanda, Burundi,
Somalia, Sudan...).
8. Of particular concern to Europe is the situ-
ation on the southern flank of the Mediterranean
where religious fundamentalism could have dire
consequences for the future of certain countries
and their peoples. The evolution of this situation
is of major importance to Europe which it would
be suicidal to underestimate. In this connection
one might recall the lessons drawn from the collo-
quy organised by our Committee in Rome in
1993, on an anti-missile defence for Europe.
9. The foregoing considerations lead us to
think that a European space-based observation
system (the need for which is proving to be most
urgent) capable of providing real time information
gathered from all over the world, is an essential
element in guaranteeing Europe's security and a
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basic tool for developing a European defence
policy; it would permit verification of treaties on
disarmament, control over armaments prolifer-
ation, conflict prevention and monitoring and pro-
tection of the environment.
10. It has already been said (Document 1435)
that space-based observation should merely be
one stage in a comprehensive system that would
also include early warning and anti-missile defence.
This will be taken up later in regard to the possi-
bilities for co-operation outside Europe in the
development of such systems.
11. The United States and Russia already have
space-based observation means, which are an
essential aspect of the exercise of their sovereign-
ty. It seems that it is now time for Europe too to
obtain means of its own, enabling it to assert its
sovereignty and independently to strengthen its
presence on the international scene and play an
active part in world security and the defence of
the values it deems to be essential.
12. The experience of the war between Iraq and
Kuwait and the conflict being waged in former
Yugoslavia have recently served to highlight both
the value of information obtained from space-
based observation and the virtual monopoly of the
United States in this area and consequently Eur-
ope's inability to act on the basis of its own
sources of information. In short, Europe must
acquire independent information means enabling
it to play its full part alongside its allies with all
the facts at its disposal.
13. The press communiqud released by the
Assembly on 11th November 1994, at a time
when rumours were circulating to the effect that
the United States was about to stop implementing
the United Nations embargo on the supply of arms
to Bosnia-Herzegovina, accurately summarises
certain arguments developed earlier. This states:
" Commenting on reports that the United
States authorities were likely to cease apply-
ing the United Nations embargo on arms
supplies to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presi-
dent of the Western European Union Assem-
bly, SirDudley Smith, M.P., today expressed
the hope that the WEU Council of Ministers,
scheduled to meet in Noordwijk (the Nether-
lands) on Monday 14th November, would
act urgently to counter the various potential
problems posed.
The United States dominates the NAIO
command structure in the Adriatic area and
the withdrawal of United States ships
and aircraft would make a mockery of
the embargo operations. WEU must be
ready to fill the breach and respond to the
challenge '0, said Sir Dudley.
This example also proves just how much
Europe needs to be autonomous where
intelligence gathering, satellite reconnais-
sance and logistic support are concerned. "
Subsequent events have merely confirmed the
above fears.
14. In short, it emerges clearly that, on the one
hand Europe's r6le in terms of world security can
be neither understood nor guaranteed if it does not
have the necessary space-based means to accom-
plish its task, and, furthermore, if its dependence
on foreign means, even those of our allies, conti-
nues, such dependence can only prevent Europe
from playing its part in the management of world
peace and security and will consequently lead to a
loss of the political weight that it should rightly
have in the international scene.
15. Recently, at a conference held at the Royal
lnstitute for International Affairs (9th February
1995) on " Western European Union: myth and
reality ", the WEIJ Secretary-General, Mr. Cuti-
leiro stated:
" All of the above is being affempted and if
I have not misjudged the attitude of govern-
ments of WEU member states, we a.re on
track and will make progress. But even if
everything goes well, WEU will still need
an armaments policy and a space policy if it
is to become a strong enough European
pillar of the alliance and a strong enough
instrument of defence of the European
Union. In conventional defence, Europe's
two glaring shortcomings are the lack of
transport systems and the lack of satellite
intelligence. To correct these deficiencies,
political will has not always been there:
money has seldom been there. Attitudes are
changing, efforts are being made but it is a
long haul. "
16. Your Rapporteurs are convinced that
giving WEU space-based means is part of the
reality that our organisation has to deal with from
now on; the latter must be persuaded that the need
for such an observation system must lead us to
overcome the major difficulties involved in crea-
ting it. These difficulties need to be faced in a
practical and realistic way, but also, and this is
essential, with a firm and resolute political will.
III. The technolngical
and industrial dime nsion
17. The colloquy held recently in San Agustin
served inter alia to confirm what we already
knew: Europe has the technological and industrial
resources to meet the challenge of building an
independent space-based observation system. If a
problem exists at all in this area it is that ofexcess
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industrial capacity, as the General Rapporteur,
Mr. Rabault (Director of Missiles and Space,
DGA (national procurement directorate), France,
noted in his conclusions to the colloquy.
18. Indeed, Documents 1393, 1434 and 1436,
mentioned previously, examine at great length
Europe's te-hnological and industrial capability
to achieve a space-based observation system.
19. This capability is by no means theoretical,
it is very real. It has been acquired and strength-
ened through the various national space pro-
grarnmes and, more particularly, the programmes
of the European Space Agency (ESA).
20. Industry's ability to meet the challenge of
space is matched by its long experience of
co-operation, not only in the framework of ESA
progralnmes but also other programmes, the most
appropriate example of which is Helios I, the
French, ltalian and Spanish joint programme
which laid the foundations for military space
prograrnmes.
21. France has a leading position among the
space industries of Europe and the experiences of
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are in
some areas complementary to it. Spain, the
Netherlands and Belgium also have proven space
industries which are perfectly capable of contri-
buting to the European- space-pro_gramme. This
prograrnme is a prime factor for European poli-
iical integration and plays a part in strengthening
and promoting European industry. Moreover this
space-based system will have spin-off in the civi-
lian sector in the form of experiments and capabi-
lities that can find application there.
IV Achipvement, costs, timetable
and operation of the system
22. Once it is admitted that Europe has a stra-
tegic need for an independent space-based observ-
ation system, built by Europeans using European
technology and since, moreover 
- 
as noted pre-
viously 
- 
such an enterprise would be a factor
of political integration, consolidation and indus-
trial expansion, a stage is reached where several
questions need to be answered: what will be the
costs of the operation, which partners are to-be
involved and what will be the time-scale?
23. One of the main reasons for co-operating in
developing such a system is obviously to share
costs. At present it would be difficult for a single
country to bear the financial burden alone.
24. As was observed correctly at the San Agu*h
colloquy, space systems are no more expensrve
than other defence systems. We need only consi-
der spending in recent years by our respective
countries on fighter aircraft to be convinced of
this fact. Moreover, space-based systems serve a
whole range of countries, for which they provide
cover, in this case, those belonging to WEU: these
are ultimately, therefore, multinational defence
systems.
25. The tables appended to the present report
illustrate certain considerations raised in this
chapter. Your Rapporteurs are unfortunately not in
a position to provide more detailed information
owing to the confidential nature of the studies
undertaken on the feasibility of the system.
26. It would be logical to assume that all WEU
members would participate financially in the sys-
temo as all would benefrt from it. It would be desi-
rable for the criteria that currently apply to mem-
ber countries' contributions to the WEU budget to
be taken as a basis, but, however this may be,
flexibility should be the guiding principle so that
all member countries are able to participate. The
wish to take part in the prograrnme should not be
used as a reference, nor should the programme be
delayed because a member is not participating.
Technological and industrial participation in
achieving the system is another matter. It would
then be appropriate, as far as possible, for indus-
trial profits to be shared in proportion to the
technological and industrial capabilities of each
country but such sharing must not lead to the tech-
nological level being lowered or to perceptible
financial increases.
27. Shared use of the system is a major diffi-
culty but one that is not insoluble. It is in fact a
maffer of harmonising the various national infor-
mation needs 
- 
obviously a very sensitive area.
28. The experience gained with Helios I will be
taken into account and in any event specifrc deter-
mination of standards to be adopted will be an
additional means of European integration and
undeniably a stimulus to the development of a
European security and defence policy.
29. The WEU Planning Cell and its intelligence
section will be able to make their opinions known
through relevant studies and assessments.
30. The projected timetable for the system
should be adhered to as closely as possible. Any
delay in decisions and hence in implementation
will only increase the difficulties and discrepan-
cies between budget forecasts and actual costs.
It is clear that many questions arising out of the
foregoing chapter cannot yet be answered
specifically and that a joint effort is required to
reach solutions that are satisfactory all round. The
means of attaining such solutions exist provided
we are convinced that the system is necessary
for Europe's security and defence and from
that conviction proceeds the determination to
achieve it, followed by the corresponding political
decision.
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V Conclusions
31. In the second part of the fortieth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly covering
the activities of the second half of 1994, in the
section on the work of the Space Group, mention
is made of a series of proposals which are to be
submitted to the ministers at the meeting of the
Council to be held in May 1995.
32. The report states that the Satellite Centre
will be able to continue its activities until the end
of 1995 without funding in addition to rhat origin-
ally granted for the experimental phase; also that
by the beginning of 1995, the Cenffe's output will
already be sufficient to evaluate its operational
capabilities.
33. It is to be hoped that the Council will reach
a decision rapidly on the Cenffe becoming perma-
nent, making it possible for it to develop its work
under normal conditions, without the difficulties
of temporary status. As to the subject-matter of
the present report, the annual report notes that the
Space Group has been tasked to prepare a pro-
posal accompanied by a draft memorandum of
understanding between present WEU member
states (i.e. the nine) for a decision by the Council
of Ministers in May 1995.
34. Moreover, the Space Group has created two
working groups: an Organising Working Group(programme management and organisational
aspects) and a Technical Working Group with the
task of elaborating " the system requirements and
the choice of system options, taking account of
the final report by the Study Management Team ".
35. These working groups might recommend
that the Space Group carry out further studies if
they consider it necessary.
36. There is every reason to think that no deci-
sion will be reached in May, flrst, because there is
a wish to know beforehand the result of the nego-
tiations between France and Germany on the lat-
ter's participation in Helios II and to be informed
of the possibility of general agreement between
the two countries on optical and radar space
observation programmes; second, because other
countries have not yet clearly identified their
needs in relation to the system and last, because
one country, without entirely closing the door on
the creation of a system of observation by satellite,
is opening it so little as virtually to prevent its
establishment.
37. The three options available in connection
with the European space-based observation sys-
tem are as follows:
(i) an independent WEU system;
(ii) a system which would take advantage
of existing efforts (mainly Helios);
(iii,) continuation of the activities of the
Satellite Centre as pursued to date, in
other words image acquisition and
processing.
38. The first of these options, and the most
ambitious, at present seems the least realistic,
mainly on account of cost; financial aspects are in
fact the prime consideration put forward by all
countries when it comes to deciding whether to go
ahead with a satellite system.
39. The third option would continue to leave
Europe without the independent information
capability it needs for its securiry and defence and
hence its sovereignty. This option would provide
no satisfactory answer to the various arguments
we have put forward so far to demonstrate Eur-
ope's need for an independent space-based
observation capability.
40. These various considerations have led your
Rapporteurs to conclude that the second option
seems the most realistic, the most easily achiev-
able and hence the most desirable.
41. Indeed, the Helios I programme would
offer substantial experience of pooling opera-
tional requirements. In a few months the system
will be operational and will begin to supply
images to the Torrej6n Satellite Centre under
agreements reached between WEU and the three
countries that have participated in developing and
producing the system: France, Italy and Spain.
The practical details of this agreement of principle
are now being studied and the results will also
constitute valuable experience which will be use-
ful if the decision finally adopted by the ministers
allows advantage to be taken of work already
completed or in progress.
42. The Helios II programme will combine
infra-red and optical technology: Osiris, another
French programme, covers radar satellites
capable of twenty-four hour, all-weather opera-
tions. France has invited Germany to take part in
these projects in conditions which are the subject
of present and future discussions and negotia-
tions. Italy and Spain, for their part, have let it be
known that a commitment by Germany to these
programmes might lead them to reconsider their
present position, namely their refusal to participate
in Helios II, mainly for financial reasons.
43. Estimates for options (i) (WEU's own sys-
tem) and (ii) (use of programmes in the process of
completion or development) as illustrated in
Table V appended to the present report show
lower costs for option (ii). Agreement between
France and Germany (whose radar satellite tech-
nology is very advanced) would be a decisive fac-
tor in obtaining backing for the proposal of your
Rapporteurs.
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M. There are many questions that a decision of
the kind we are proposing here might raise in
terms of financial participation, system users
(WEU or WEU and individual counffies?), indus-
trial involvement (which should combine effi-
ciency and national industrial interests while
taking account of the fact that fair return has a
more political than industrial dimension and is a
very effective means of achieving European inte-
gration) and the most desirable course to be
followed (an international executive agency, a
WEU space agency?) etc.
45. Apart from the problems outlined above, a
major hurdle has to be overcome: the Helios sys-
tem is not a development that can be publicly
unveiled. The difficulties raised by its integration
into WEU structures will be greater than those
encountered over the supply of Helios images to
the Torrej6n Satellite Centre: while an image is a
finished product, a system is a far more complex
whole which needs to be brought out into the open
so that it can be sold to third parties.
46. Your Rapporteurs have no intention of sup-
plying answers to all the problems raised; these
answers should proceed from rigorous analysis
and negotiations in the framework of the WEU
Council. In our view, the aim of this report should,
first and foremost, be to promote the establish-
ment of a space-based observation system and
then to ensure that a decision is taken in favour of
the option we feel is most in conformity with the
interests of Europe and the most realistic from a
technological and financial point of view. We also
hope that the chosen solution will obtain the
necessary consensus and allow participation by
all WEU member countries.
47. Europe must acquire an independent space-
based observation system, but clearly, at the same
time, it must establish close co-operation in this
area with the United States and Russia, for we feel
it is necessary for the various systems to be com-
plementary and, in short, as the General Rappor-
ieur of the San Agustin colloquy, Mr. Rabault
(Director of Missiles and Space, DGA) put it, to
marry autonomy and interdependence.
48. Moreover, our Assembly has on other occa-
sions spoken out strongly in favour of intensive
co-opeiation with our American allies on early
warning and anti-missile defence systems. Colla-
boration with our transatlantic allies, and possibly
with Russia, should, in our opinion, therefore be
undertaken under the conditions referred to earlier.
49. On 6th February 1995, at the meeting
between the Presidential Committee of our
Assembly and the Secretary-General of WEU,
Mr. Cutileiro, answering a question put to him by
the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee, Mr.L6pez Henares, stressed that the
establishment of a European space-based obser-
vation capability was still a very long way off.
50. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur,
addressing the Assembly on 30th November
1994, stated for his part:
" This is an operational, technological and
industrial project which will emancipate
Europe in some measure in the matter of
space reconnaissance. I say emancipate
deliberately. I discussed the subject yes-
terday evening and as late as this morning
with Chancellor Kohl at the Franco-
German summit just held in Bonn. I have
every hope that here too the determination
of our two countries will enable Europe to
take a further step towards equipping itself
with the operational resources that it lacks. "
51. Finally one might recall the remarks of the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kinkel,
at the Koenigswinter conference which periodi-
cally brings together senior German and United
Kingdom officials. At the conference held last
March, Mr. Kinkel, recalling the particular inter-
est the Franco-German partnership holds for his
counbry, for historical reasons, invited the United
Kingdom, together with France and Germany, to
build a Europe close to its citizens, competitive
and ready for action. Referring to the CFSP, Mr.
Kinkel felt that majority decisions should not be
taboo in the areas that relate to it.
52. In conclusion, your Rapporteurs would first
state ttreir wish to see all WEU member countries
participate in establishing a European space-
based observation system based on the option
they consider most appropriate and to which they
have just referred. Second, they wish to emphas-
ise that it does not seem reasonable to perpetuate
the present situation where the rhythm of the deci-
sion-making process is imposed by those who
wish to progress the most slowly or who want
purely and simply to call a halt. Third, in the
absence of ajoint decision, it would be necessary
initially to foresee launching a project involving
the four countries that envisage co-operating in
Helios, followed by participation by all member
countries in the next generation of the system,
around 2005. Meanwhile, the meeting point for all
concerned would be the Torrej6n Satellite Centre.
53. Political will has already been shown by
the creation of the Satellite Centre, but this work
has to be completed. All that is still lacking is the
political will that must be expressed without fur-
ther delay, since all other difficulties can be resol-
ved, as we feel we have shown in our various
reports on this subject.
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APPENDIX I
Potentinl Earopean earth obsematian system
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APPENDIX tr
System architectare
i- I Concept, Development & Manufacturing
[_-l in operation
A wEU Planning
Opti*f
T-_
l__9t
fan Satellite
r-I National Small Satt_ __
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WEUSC Torrejon
Concept Studies, Technology Programmes
94 lss so',97rgs 2ooo I 01
optical satellite HELlos ll
on demand
Elements Capabilities Performance
1 Opticat Satellite
E Panchromatic
- 
Close look
- 
Survey mode
tr Ancillary options
- 
rR/TR.
- 
Stereo
tr Global reference information
tr Crisis indicators
(change detection)
tr Mapping for out of region/out of
area interventions
E Signarures, terrain profiles
Spatial resolution
< I m close look mode
< l0 m survey mode
< 2 m height resolution (stereo)
2 sAR satenite
tr S-lX-band
- 
Close look
- 
Survey mode
All-weather capability, day & night,
additional (SAR-) signatures
3 m close look
10 m survey mode
3 pns/sarcovt DRS for real-time capability combi-
nation with MILSATCOM to be
clarified
Data transmission
> 500 Mb/sec
Ground station(s)
Supplementary
Small Satellites
Operation of satellites, mission-
planning and near real-time proces-
sing and interpretation
Complementary element in times of
crisis and/or for specific tasks
Access time (data availability)
< 2.5 hrs
Spatial resolution
< 3m
I Nat. lnfo CenterL-
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APPENDX III
Basis for cost calculation in roagh order of magnitude
(MECU)
WEU system proposal French/German co-operation
2 optical satellites in orbit 2 optical satellites in orbit
2 SAR satellites in orbit 2 SAR satellites in orbit
2 DRS in orbit I DRS in orbit
Small satellites on demand 
- 
none foreseen
T'T&C TT&C
I system operation centre 2 system operation centres
1 mission control centre 1 mission conffol cenfies
1 central PAIF National PAIF (not included in the cost figure)
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APPENDD( tV
Programme cost profik
Economic conditions I 993
MECU
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